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PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
P. Raymond Lamonica*
EXCLUSIONARY POLICY
Fifth Circuit's Fourth**
In the last several years many of the rules of search and seizure
(including arrest) have been refined, clarified and further developed.1
At this critical point in the development of fourth amendment and
Louisiana constitutional privacy protections, it is perhaps more ap-
propriate to examine developments relating to the exclusionary
sanction than simply to catalogue further the rules and interesting
applications. While there continue to remain important questions
about the scope and nature of the search and seizure protections, if
the nature of the exclusionary sanction is altered, such questions, at
least in criminal proceedings, may remain largely academic.
United States v. Williams2 presents an example of the real and
immediate vulnerability of the exclusionary sanction. Williams was
arrested for violating post-conviction bail restrictions. Heroin was
seized from her person and subsequently from her luggage after of-
ficers obtained a warrant. The arrest was challenged on the grounds
that the agent was not authorized by the statutory scheme to effect
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
**If the anticipated reorganization of the present fifth circuit to include Louisiana,
Texas and Mississippi takes effect, the results should not differ. Eight judges of the
new fifth circuit (Gee, Coleman, Brown, Ainsworth, C. Clark, Garza, Reavley, and S.
Johnson) wrote or joined in Part II of the opinion purportedly modifying the exclu-
sionary rule. Only four judges of the new fifth circuit (Rubin, Politz, Randall, and Tate)
declined to take the opportunity to limit the exclusionary sanction. In the new
eleventh circuit, however, only five judges wrote or joined in Part II of the opinion
(Vance, Roney, Tjoflat, Hill, and Fay). Six judges joined Judge Rubin's concurring opin-
ion (Godbold, Kravitch, Frank Johnson, Hatchett, Anderson, and Thomas Clark) and
one judge joined only Judge Politz in Part I (Henderson).
1. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980) (need for warrant to ar-
rest in residence); United States v. Crews, 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980) (presence of defen-
dant as a fruit of unconstitutional arrest); Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (un-
constitutional statute can provide probable cause); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979) (need for warrant for items connected with automobile); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) (nature of interest to establish standing-scope of exclusionary policy);
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (attenuation of unconstitutional seizure);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (search of movable property).
2. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the arrest. The district court found the arrest unlawful and sup-
pressed the evidence. The en banc decision of the fifth circuit
reversed the panel decision' which also held the arrest unauthorized.
In the en banc decision no member of the court expressed doubts
about the validity of the arrest.4 If the arrest was illegal, the court
of appeals would have been required to determine whether violation
of a statutory, rather than constitutional, provision justified an ex-
clusionary sanction. That sanction, if applied, traditionally would be
pursuant to the court's supervisory authority.' The fourth amend-
ment exclusionary policy properly would not have had to be reached.
Additionally, with respect to the heroin found pursuant to the war-
rant, distinct exclusionary policy concerns are present.' After fin-
ding the arrest legal, it is indeed curious that a majority of the
court felt compelled, or even that it was appropriate judicial crafts-
manship, to go further. A majority of the en banc panel did go further
in an unusually organized opinion.
The opinion is written in two parts. Part I was written by Judge
Politz and concurred in by fifteen others. Part I holds the arrest to
be legally authorized and directs "reversed" and "remanded."7 Part
II written by Judges Gee and Vance and concurred in by eleven
others to constitute a majority of the twenty-four member panel
concludes "reversed."8 While indicating they "do not disagree with
[Part I]" since some had concurred, the Part II judges conclude "[it
is our view, however, that the drugs suppressed as evidence by the
trial judge and by our panel should not have been and that to sup-
press them was wrong whether or not Williams' violation of a bond
condition was such a crime as warranted her arrest . . ,
The Part II judges emphasize,
Sitting en banc, we now hold that evidence is not to be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by of-
3. 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. Judges Goldberg and Simpson, who wrote the three-panel majority, did not
participate in the en banc decision. Judge Charles Clark, who dissented, joined Part II
of the opinion.
5. See, e.g., McNabb v. Mallory, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942) ("a conviction resting on
evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress
has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves ac-
complices in willful disobedience of law"). But see United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct.
2439 (1980) (Court refused to exclude evidence pursuant to its supervisory authority).
6. For example, whether the interposing of judicial authority should effectively
attenuate the original illegality (as opposed to unconstitutionality).
7. 622 F.2d at 839.
8. 622 F.2d at 847.
9. Id at 840.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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ficers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in
the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.
We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or
flagrant actions by police, not reasonable good faith ones."
Judge Rubin, with whom nine other judges joined, including Judge
Politz, specially concurs, and challenges Part II of the opinion:
[Miany of my brethren have seized the occasion to discuss what
they consider an alternative ground for decision, but what is to
me purely a hypothetical: whether the evidence would have been
admissible had the search been unconstitutional. Judicial self-
restraint should command us to defer until another day the
discussion of issues that might have been material had the ar-
rest been improper."
To Judge Rubin's rather traditional suggestion, Judges Hill and Fay
say in a specially concurring opinion they are "intrigued but not pur-
suaded" by the "new approach" and state, "[i]f we find evidence ad-
missible without regard to the constitutional question, we should
decline to reach and decide the latter."" They apparently reject that
consideration of the exclusionary sanction is a constitutional ques-
tion or that Part I did exactly what they suggest.
Something appears awry. Consider a court finding a legal (as
well as constitutional) arrest, going further and saying that if the ar-
rest were illegal (as well as unconstitutional) then it would not ex-
clude evidence, while rejecting the opinion of those who suggest
that since the arrest was found legal no further inquiry is
necessary.4
Apparently the discontent with the perception of the exclu-
sionary rule among the Part II judges was so great as to cause them
to deviate from the traditional judicial decision-writing process.
Reassessment of exclusionary policy is much needed. A rational
demarcation of the nature and scope of exclusionary policy is of ut-
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. 622 F.2d at 848 (Rubin, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
13. 622 F.2d at 847 (Fay & Hill, J.J., concurring).
14. In an introductory law school text the author feels no need to cite authority
for the axiomatic proposition:
A basic premise of our legal system is that courts should decide only the case
presented to them. That courts create law for future cases is only incidental to
their resolution of particular disputes. Therefore, if in deciding a particular
dispute a court indicates what its decision would be if the facts or questions were
other than those presented, a future court in the same jurisdiction would not be
bound to decide a future case in accordance with the "dictum," that is language
not necessary to the court's resolution of the problem.
ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 19 (1970).
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most concern to all involved in the judicial and governmental
systems. United States v. Williams, however, in addition to being
technically unorthodox and lacking in traditional judicial restraint,
provides no substantial guidance. What, for example, is its impact
on warrant cases? Is not reliance on a warrant always reasonable?
Is Williams reconcilable with the recent decision in Payton v. New
York, 5 where the exclusionary sanction was applied when officers in
good faith relied upon a statute authorizing a warrantless entry to
effect an arrest? Who has the burden of showing good faith reason-
ableness and what is the nature of that burden? Why is it necessary
to have subjective good faith and objective reasonableness to
achieve the posited limited purpose of the exclusionary rule? Is sub-
jective good faith a workable and realistic standard in this context?
Is it ever necessary for a court to determine whether there is a
fourth amendment protection, or is an evaluation of good faith and
reasonableness upon an arguendo assumption of such a protection
sufficient? If an arguendo assumption is sufficient for good faith
cases, how will the further development of the fourth amendment be
affected when only bad faith cases are considered? Will the further
delineation of fourth amendment protections more likely be
developed in non-criminal cases, and is that appropriate?
It is unfortunate that the decision which was obviously intended
to restructure the nature of fourth amendment protections gives
neither real guidance nor an adequate rationale upon which future
cases may be evaluated. It undoubtedly will cause much discussion
and litigation. It is hoped that Williams might serve as a vehicle to
cause a higher level of evaluation of exclusionary policy. The pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule must be more than "to deter willful or
flagrant actions by police .. ". .' I Such a posited purpose indeed sets
up a "strawman" which is easily demolished. Perhaps the problem is
of such complexity and importance that the merit of traditional
judicial decision making, in which the court, with the assistance of
counsel, addresses the complex but limited issues presented on a
case-by-case basis to develop a fundamentally sound rule of law,
ought to be reconsidered.
Louisiana Exclusionary Policy
In 1971' 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected defense
counsel's contention that an arrest ought to be declared illegal and
evidence suppressed because of the failure of the officers to comply
15. 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
16. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980).
17, State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200 (1971).
[Vol. 41
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with articles 228, 229, and 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
relating to booking and informing of rights. Defense counsel had
urged that "unless the arrest is nullified and the evidence seized in
connection therewith suppressed . . . there will be widespread
disregard of these provisions which are vital safeguards against
secret arrests and improper police tactics."'8 With no justice dissen-
ting on this issue, Justice Summers wrote for the court, "[tihe
answer to his contention is that a penalty for failure to comply with
these requirements is provided by law. A peace officer who fails to
book his prisoner promptly .. .or the booking officer who fails to
give the prisoner information required . . . will be guilty of
malfeasance in office . . . .'"' An exclusionary sanction was rejected
because the statutes had "no bearing upon the legality of an arrest
which is otherwise lawfully made on reasonable belief or probable
cause. A departure from acceptable concepts of judicial restraint
would occur if this Court were to superimpose an exclusionary rule
over [the] . . . legislative plan ....""
While one might suggest that the threatened malfeasance pro-
secution is to blink at reality, the decision made clear that there was
no automatic exclusionary sanction for statutory violations and that,
if there were a sanction at all, statutory violations would be con-
sidered in light of statutory purpose and exclusionary impact.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's attitude toward the exclu-
sionary sanction is reflected further in recent cases in which the ex-
clusionary sanction was found appropriate for statutory non-
constitutional violations. In State v. Longlois," a unanimous opinion,
the defendant was arrested by an agent of the Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries and charged with and subsequently convicted
of possession of marijuana. The court examined the statutory
authority of wildlife agents and concluded they "were never meant
to have the power to make arrests for possession of marijuana.1 2
The court also determined that "the arrest was also illegal as an
arrest by a private citizen,"2 being a misdemeanor.24 While in-
dicating private action might not be covered by article I, section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution, the court avoided the issue by correctly
finding state action. 5
18. 257 La. at 783, 244 So. 2d at 214.
19. Id
20. 257 La. at 786, 244 So. 2d at 215.
21. 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979).
22. Id. at 1210.
23. Id.
24. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 214. LA. R.S. 40:966 (D) (Supp. 1970).
25. 374 So. 2d at 1211. See State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978). See also The
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Recognizing that whether evidence should be suppressed by a
person acting under color of law but outside the scope of his
statutory authority had never been decided, the court nevertheless,
without extended discussion, concluded that the exclusionary policy
was "necessary to discourage police officers, both regular and
special, from unreasonably exceeding their lawful authority."2
In State v. Patton,27 another unanimous opinion, a district at-
torney's investigator observed defendant's serious wreckless driving
and caused him to stop by using his lights and siren. He took note of
the name and other information from the driver's license and re-
leased defendant but later caused an arrest warrant to issue.
As in Longlois, the court determined that the investigator
lacked statutory authority to arrest or to detain. The court then con-
sidered whether the "identification testimony must be suppressed if
it is a fruit of an illegal arrest or detention."28 The court expressly
rejected cases which had held that identification of a defendant was
not the fruit of an illegal arrest. The distinction between testimonial
and tangible evidence was described as "irrational and untenable."29
Without expressly considering the distinction between a constitu-
tional violation and the extant statutory violation, the court applied
the exclusionary sanction.
Longlois and Patton both reflect an exclusionary policy broader
than that previously established.2 Previously, violation of a state
statute had not resulted in an exclusionary sanction. While an exclu-
sionary sanction might in some instances be appropriate for viola-
tion of statutes (or state constitutional rights), more guidance on the
purpose of the sanction is needed. A question which immediately
arises and needs resolving is whether the failure to comply with the
Louisiana Constitution, article I, section 13 right (restated in article
218.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an arrested or retained
person "be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention")
should result in an exclusionary sanction.
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-78 Term-Pretrial Criminal Pro-
cedure, 39 LA. L. REV. 917, 924 (1979).
26. 374 So. 2d at 1211 (emphasis added).
27. 374 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1979).
28. Id. at 1213.
29. Id.
30. State v. Case, 363 So. 2d 486, 491 (La. 1978), which was decided on several
grounds, including absence of an affidavit and lack of specific descriptions, and thus
not as persuasive as Longlois or Patton on the statutory exclusionary rule question,
previously indicated that a warrant issued by a city judge for an area outside his ter-
ritorial jurisdiction was invalid and thus grounds for exclusion. In the same case the
court declined to look at the objection to the warrant being executed on Sunday
without express authorization.
[Vol. 41
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Patton's language indicating the "untenability" of a distinction
between testimonial and tangible evidence as it is used to resolve
the identification issue is also noteworthy. In United States v.
Crews,31 a woman was robbed in the ladies room of the Washington
Monument. The victim gave a detailed description of the robber.
Several days later defendant was detained illegally and a
photograph was taken. The victim identified defendant in the photo
and subsequent lineup identifications. Justice Brennan set forth a
new approach to analyzing the tainted identification problem:
A victim's in-court identification of the accused has three
distinct elements. First, the victim is present at trial to testify
as to what transpired ... and to identify the defendant .... Sec-
ond, the victim possesses knowledge of and the ability to
reconstruct the prior criminal occurrence and to identify the
defendant from her observations of him at the time of the crime.
And third, the defendant is also physically present in the court-
room, so that the victim can observe him and compare his ap-
pearance to that of the offender.2
Justice Brennan found that factually neither the presence of the vic-
tim at the defendant's trial nor her ability to give accurate informa-
tion was the product of the unlawful arrest. Significantly, however,
a majority of the court (not including Justice Brennan) held that the
third element, defendant's presence, can never be the fruit of a prior
illegality. Thus, a defendant may be brought to court for trial (and
identification) even though illegally arrested.
In State v. Brown,33 the defendant was arrested in his home
without a warrant. In dicta the court accepted the Payton v. New
York" holding and independently concluded that "[sluch a war-
rantless arrest in a home is also prohibited by article I, section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution of.1974."'3 However, finding the arrest to
violate the federal and state constitutions, citing United States v.
Crews36 as authority, it did not suppress, "[a]lthough the line-up was
the product of illegal arrest, [because] the victim's in-court identifica-
tion had a source independent from the arrest and was clearly not
affected by the line-up."37 State v. Patton's treatment of the iden-
tification issue was not discussed. The Patton identification might
still fail the Crews-Brown test because it is not clear that the officer
31. 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980).
32. Id. at 1250.
33. 387 So. 2d 567 (La. 1980).
34. 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
35. 387 So. 2d at 569.
36. 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980).
37. 387 So. 2d at 569.
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in the victimless crime would be able to identify the defendant ab-
sent the illegality.
These cases are not presented in an attempt to reflect fully the
attitude of the Louisiana Supreme Court toward the exclusionary
sanction. It is not yet possible to accurately characterize that at-
titude because of the absence of extensive discussion by the court.
One should not, however, conclude that the court is generally apply-
ing the exclusionary sanction more expansively than it has pre-
viously.
State v. Grogan"8 is an interesting example. A fourth amend-
ment, article I, section 5, attenuation problem was presented. The
constitutional attenuation issue is, of course, simply a particularized
inquiry regarding the scope of exclusionary policy. Grogan, thus, is
reflective of the court's attitude toward constitutional exclusionary
policy. The defendant was illegally arrested and jailed for resisting
an officer. The next day while still in jail and after having been
given his Miranda warnings on at least three occasions, the defen-
dant confessed to a burglary. The voluntariness of the statement
was not challenged. The sole issue was whether the statement was a
fruit of the unconstitutional arrest.
The plurality opinion by Justice Marcus indicates that the
"primary, if not exclusive, purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter future unlawful police misconduct . . . ."" After finding that
the custodial arrest was "at most a minor violation of the fourth
amendment"' and that the confession was voluntary, he determined
that the illegality had been attenuated. The confession was obtained
less than twenty-four hours after arrest, while the defendant was
still in custody and after he was advised that he failed a lie detector
test given while in custody. Additionally, the "police officers acted
in good faith, believing that defendant's conduct in fleeing . . .war-
ranted such an arrest."4
Again in State v. Singleton,4" a limited exclusionary policy was
implemented. The court refused to extend the fifth amendment/arti-
cle I, section 13 exclusionary sanction of In re Dino' to the broad
38. 373 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1979).
39. Id. at 1303.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id at 1304.
42. 376 So. 2d 143 (La. 1979).
43. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1977-78 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 39 LA. L. REV. 918, 930 (1979); Note,
A Cautious Step Forward, 39 LA. L. REv. 278 (1978).
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standing rights of article I, section 54 of the Louisiana Constitution.
A statement was obtained from a juvenile in violation of Dino. The
statement was then used to obtain a search warrant. The court
refused to order suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to
the warrant because defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the
violation of the juvenile's Dino rights. Only Justice Dennis
dissented, citing the expanded notion of standing, and thus exclu-
sionary policy, as reflected in article I, section 5. The opinion ap-
pears to indicate the broader exclusionary sanction is unavailable in
search cases if the defect is not based directly upon article I, section
5. Article I, section 13 rights, insofar as expanded standing is con-
cerned, apparently will be treated in the traditional, more limited
manner.4" The dicta of Justice Dennis in State v. Bouffanie" is
rendered suspect:
If the detention of a person for questioning without being
advised of his rights and the reason for his arrest, as required
by Article I, § 13, or the compulsion of him to give evidence
against himself in contravention of Article I, §§ 13 and 16, con-
stitutes an unreasonable seizure of his person, anyone adversely
affected by the seizure has standing to raise its illegality.47
While the court does not directly address Justice Dennis' state-
ment in Bouffanie, it appears the court is unwilling to hold that a
seizure of the person is unreasonable for failure to comply with arti-
cle I, section 13 protections.
In State v. Roubion," a unanimous court held that the uninten-
tional failure of an affiant to sign an affidavit for a warrant when
the affiant was sworn and known to the magistrate did not merit
the exclusionary sanction. Interestingly, the court looked to the
legislative scheme and concluded, "we find no legislative intention
to exclude evidence derived from a search warrant because of the
very limited imperfection . . . -'" Aside from the new electronic
surveillance act, ° this writer is unaware of any Louisiana legislation
which addresses the exclusionary issue.
These cases reflect the absence of a fully developed rationale for
44. "[Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation
of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality .... " LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
45. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Alderman, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); State v. Mitchell, 278 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973).
46. 364 So. 2d 971 (La. 1978).
47. Id. at 976.
48. 378 So. 2d 411 (La. 1979).
49. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
50. 1980 La. Acts, No. 241, adding LA. R.S. 15:1307.
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the exclusionary sanction. Until such is developed the level of
predictability must be less than great. An effective and fair system
of law need not, and perhaps should not, have a simplistic automatic
exclusionary rule, whether it relate to statutory, federal or state
constitutional rights. It is imperative, however, that the underlying
reasons for exclusionary policy be directly, frankly, and carefully ad-
dressed if a rational exclusionary policy is to be developed.
ANONYMOUS TIPS AND SEIZURES
In Adams v. Williams,"1 the most expansive treatment by the
Supreme Court of the Terry2 limited seizure rationale, Justice
Rhenquist, writing for the 6-3 majority upholding a seizure based
upon an informant's tip, carefully noted, "[t]he informant was known
to him personally and had provided him with information in the
past. This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an
anonymous telephone tip."5
The Louisiana Supreme Court has now been called upon to
determine the validity of a seizure (stop) based upon such an
anonymous telephone tip. State v. Jernigan54 presents a situation
where the police received a telephone call from an unidentified
caller who said that a black male wearing a yellow shirt and blue
pants and armed with a hand gun was sitting at a named bar. An of-
ficer was notified by radio and proceeded to the bar where he
observed only one person who met the description. The officer then
"directed him to stand up, and immediately conducted a frisk."55 He
felt a gun and removed it.
The court recognized that the question previously had not been
addressed by it. With a rather brief discussion, the seizure was
upheld. The court noted, "our research reveals that most of the
federal circuit courts of appeal and state appellate courts, including
that of the District of Columbia, which have had occasion to consider
the propriety of investigatory police action based upon information
from an anonymous source have approved the actions of the law en-
forcement officers" and concluded, "[wie likewise hold that an
anonymous tip can provide the basis for an investigatory stop."56
51. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869 (1974); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pretrial Criminal
Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575 (1976). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979).
53. 407 U.S. at 146.
54. 377 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1979).
55. Id. at 1224.
56. Id. at 1225. One might question whether some of the cases do support the
broad holding in Jernigan. The salient factors in these cases briefly are noted here.
[Vol. 41
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Jernigan's significance is that it established that an anonymous
tip may be the basis for a stop and immediate frisk. No information
other than the unremarkable corroboration that a black man was in
a bar wearing a yellow shirt and blue pants was present. There was
an absence of information indicating that the information given was
See id. at 1225 n.3. See, e.g., United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1978);
(anonymous caller informs of man with bomb in orange shopping bag; after announce-
ment of bomb threat unusual behavior with bag is noticed and there is an attempted
escape with the bag; suspect was flying under a false name; suspects denied knowing
each other; one of the two person consented to the search and the other denied any
connection therewith); United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1977) (informant
present when police responded to call and confirmed description; detective identified
self and asked defendant to get out of car; saw gun before seizing the weapon); United
States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1973) (police radio bulletin informed that
particularly described car carried illegal aliens; officer stopped car and asked for
license and then the persons in the back of the car were in plain view); United States
v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970) (caller identified himself and informed that
particularly described man was selling postal money orders at certain bar; inspector
stopped the defendant and the defendant displayed his gun before the officer
searched); People v. Lopez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1975) (anonymous informer told police
that described individual was selling marijuana at a designated place; defendant in-
vited police into his apartment where officers smelled and saw marijuana; defendant
consented to the search); United States v. Walker, 294 A.2d 376 (D.C. App. 1972)
(anonymous informer told that a certain named man with an artificial leg had a gun; of-
ficers found that certain individual fitting the description was in the designated loca-
tion and confirmed that he had an artificial leg; officers frisked for weapons and found
the gun); State v. Hetland, 366 So. 2d 831 (Fla. App. 1979) (police informed by car radio
that named individual was proceeding to shoot someone; defendant confirmed that his
name is the one given to the officers; officers asked defendant to stand and the gun
was seen before the search occurred); State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 523 P.2d 523
(1974) (anonymous informant told that certain individual possesses illegal drugs; police
stopped car and saw pharmaceutical bottles and also that defendant was attempting to
hide them; defendant voluntarily gave the drugs over to the police); People v.
McElroy, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 358 N.E.2d 1180 (1976) (radio informed police that a par-
ticularly described woman was carrying a gun; officers asked if they could search her
purse; defendant became hostile and was arrested; defendant admitted that she
possessed a gun before the police searched); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 366 Mass.
394, 318 N.E.2d 834 (1974) (officer received note that informant personally observed an
armed man; defendant fit description and acted suspiciously and attempted to do away
with the bag; officer stopped the defendant and the bag fell and the contents fell out);
People v. Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978) (informant told the police in per-
son that he had observed defendant with a gun; officer frisked the defendant and seized
the gun); State ex rel H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977) (radio dispatch that a
described individual possessed a gun; defendant was the only one in fifteen persons at
the designated place that fit the description; officer frisked for gun and seized it); Peo-
ple v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832, 373 N.E.2d 372 (1977) (anonymous call informed that cer-
tain named individual was carrying a gun; defendant confirmed.this was his name; of-
ficer frisked and seized the gun); State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530
(1973) (the evidence was suppressed; informant personally entered police station and
told officer that he had observed individual with marijuana under his hat; officer was
informed by police station that there was sufficient cause to stop the vehicle; the mari-
juana was then in plain view.
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based upon personal knowledge rather than rumor or unreliable
hearsay. Terry57 required that "the police officer ... be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inference from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion." That
requirement appears to be relaxed.
Apparently of critical significance was that the informant's tip
described a crime (possession of a concealed weapon) which the
court considered "presented an immediate danger to the public, a
danger aggravated by its occurence in an occupied alcholic beverage
outlet."58 It appears that the Jernigan rationale is limited to seizures
involving dangerous weapons in bars. It may be that is is limited to
neighborhood bars rather than restaurant-bars where violent con-
duct is less frequent. These questions, however, remain.
In State v. Bolden," again a seizure (stop) was upheld based
upon information given by an informant. While the informant might
be characterized as anonymous because his name was not acquired,
unlike the informant in Jernigan the informant here accompanied
the police in their investigation. The informant personally advised
police that the defendant was at a bar with a sawed-off shotgun
stuck in the front of his pants. He was described in more detail, in-
cluding the information that he was wearing a black full-length
leather coat, a black hat, a vest, and tan or gold pants. The infor-
mant advised that the shotgun was in the right side of his trousers.
When the officer arrived at the bar it was closed, but one officer
knew that the bar's patrons usually went to a caf6 after the bar's
closing. They waited five minutes before defendant arrived, got out
of a car and walked away from the cafe. The defendant was stopped
and frisked. Upon pushing the unbuttoned coat aside, the butt of the
shotgun could be seen. Justice Watson, writing for the court,
acknowledged State v. Jernigan but emphasized that "[ijnformant's
tips vary greatly, however, in their value and reliability, rendering
impossible one rule to cover every situation.""0
Bolden appears to be more limited and more appropriate than
Jernigan. Unlike Jernigan, the informant personally was willing to
come forward and to accompany the officers. A person who is will-
ing to come forward is usually considered more likely to be credible
than an anonymous tipster."' Also, the distinctive apparel made it
57. 392 U.S. at 21.
58. 377 So. 2d at 1225 (emphasis added).
59. 380 So. 2d 40 (1980). See Note, State v. Bolden: Louisiana's Anomalous
Reliance on the Anonymous Informant, 41 LA. L. REV. - (1981).
60. Id. at 42.
61. See note 72, infra.
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unlikely that the wrong person would be confronted by police. Final-
ly, in Bolden the officer is more reasonably assured that the infor-
mation is first-hand, although better practice would be affirmatively
to establish first-hand knowledge.
The court, however, did not express a distinction from Jernigan
based on these features. Some might suggest that the protections in
Bolden were less than the protections in Jernigan, even though the
informant in Bolden was willing to come forward. The fact that in
Jernigan a disinterested party, the officer accepting the information
by telephone, was initially involved, rather than as in Bolden where
the person initially involved conducted the seizure, might be con-
sidered more protective. It appears to this writer, however, that in
terms of individual privacy protections, a person who comes forward
and is willing personally to inform a police officer is more likely to
tell the truth than one who simply makes such an allegation over
the telephone. It is also more likely that the person will have first-
hand information rather than report based upon rumor. The concern
that the officer on the street will fabricate a Bolden-type informant
is valid, but the problem of the officer fabricating facts is not, as a
practical matter, well-controlled in any of the informant probable
cause situations.62
In both cases it is clear that the intrusion is limited to cir-
cumstances involving dangerous weapons (or a "particularly"
dangerous weapon as in Bolden) and a public setting involving bars.
Obviously, the court is aware of the serious danger of firearms in
bars and must have considered that as a significant factor in finding
the justification for the intrusion. The Jernigan-Bolden rationales,
however, properly should neither be expanded into other possessory
offenses nor expanded to constitute probable cause. 3
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WARRANTS
The 1980 Regular Legislative Session enacted for the first time
legislation authorizing limited electronic surveillance. 4 Since 1968,
with the enactment by Congress of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act,65 states were required to enact legislation before
62. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 330 So. 2d 284 (La. 1976); State v. Giordano, 284 So. 2d
880 (La. 1973); State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973). See also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37
LA. L. REV. 535, 539 (1977).
63. This case should not be construed as changing the requirements of probable
cause in warrant or more serious intrustion ("arrest") cases. See, e.g., State v. Nor-
mand, 380 So. 2d 1207 (1980) (unanimous per curiam).
64. 1980 La. Acts, No. 241, adding LA. R.S. 15:1301-12.
65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
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state courts could authorize electronic surveillance." Unauthorized
interceptions carried federal criminal sanctions. 7 Because the
federal statute requires substantial conformity with it,6" the state
statute is patterned in large part after the federal. While the state
act parallels the federal act in many ways, the state provision is
much more restrictive and protective of privacy interests. It is ap-
propriate here briefly to indicate the distinctive features of the
state act, particularly as they relate to warrant applications.
Investigative and law enforcement officers are narrowly defined
in the Act to mean employees of the Department of Public Safety
who in the normal course of their duties are investigating the
enumerated drug offenses and attorneys authorized to participate in
prosecutions of such offenses. 9 A warrant application may be made
only when the district attorney and attorney general concur."° The
application is presented to a district judge who must be the senior
judge or a judge designated in advance by majority vote of the
court to consider applications for electronic surveillance warrants.71
This limitation is designed to eliminate "judge-shopping" and to en-
courage the development of expertise in the new and detailed pro-
cedure by the authorized judges.
Perhaps the most significant deviation from the federal statute
relates to the probable cause requirement itself. While the statute
includes the detailed probable cause statement and warrant pro-
cedure of the federal act," it goes further to attempt to eliminate
possible abuses by the use of informants. If statements of an iden-
tified or unidentified informant are relied upon to establish probable
cause for the offense, the application must set forth the factual basis
for the applicant's belief that the informant is credible and facts in-
dicating that the information was obtained by him in a reliable man-
ner. This appears to add nothing to present requirements for the
unidentified informant but more clearly requires a statement
relating to credibility of the identified informant; it may be that a
person's willingness to be identified is sufficient to establish such
credibility.73 Facts relating to how the person obtained the informa-
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976).
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-12 (1976).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976).
69. LA. R.S. 15:1302(5) (Supp. 1980).
70. LA. R.S. 15:1308 (Supp. 1980).
71. LA. R.S. 15:1302(7) (Supp. 1980).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976).
73. See, e.g., State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976); State v. Devall, 296 So. 2d
802 (La. 1974); State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681 (La. 1974); The Work of The Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L.
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tion are, of course, necessary whether the informant be identified or
not.7"
The identified or unidentified informant must then be presented
to the judge and sworn and examined by the judge to determine if
the written statements are true."5 This procedure, while requiring
the judge to personally examine the informant, maintains the "four-
corners" warrant doctrine."6 The provision also clearly establishes
that the privileged character of the identity of an informant is not
affected. Thus, to the extent a privilege for the disclosure of an
unidentified informant exists, this provision does not change it."
Perhaps the most difficult warrant problem presented by the
Act relates to the apparent legislative abhorrence of "hearsay
statements." While hearsay concerns are to some extent alleviated
by requiring the informant to appear before the court, the legisla-
tion also limits the use of "hearsay statements" to establish critical
facts relating to probable cause. Facts relating to the offense itself,
that a particular communication will be intercepted, and that the
particular facilities will be used, must all be established exclusive of
"hearsay statements."78 "Hearsay statements" are not defined; the
legislation is thus unclear on whether it should be construed literally
or construed to mean inadmissible or unreliable hearsay. Since much
hearsay is admissible at the trial itself, it may not be appropriate to
strictly construe the term. On the other hand, the legislature has ex-
pressed a strong concern about the use of informants and hearsay.
The legislature also expressed a strong concern about intercep-
ting lawyers' communications. The Act provides that the judge must
find that the interception "is not reasonably expected to intercept
privileged communications."79 It thus may be impossible to lawfully
intercept a practicing attorney's office communications where it
reasonably can be anticipated that privileged communications will
result.
Limiting the use of electronic surveillance to Department of
Public Safety personnel and the crimes to drug offenses may pre-
sent some difficult problems when, while engaged in an authorized
REV. 575, 579-83 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 535, 538 (1977).
74. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 253 La. 925, 221 So. 2d 50 (1969); Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
75. LA. R.S. 15:1310B(1) (Supp. 1980).
76. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 162; State v. Case, 363 So. 2d 486 (1978).
77. See, e.g., State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973).
78. See LA. R.S. 15:1310A(2); 15:1310C(1), C(2), C(4) (Supp. 1980).
79. LA. R.S. 15:1310C(5) (Supp. 1980).
1981]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
intercept, other offenses are discovered. The Act does present
limited guidance. Disclosure of information acquired by interception
is restricted to that obtained which "relates directly to the offense
for which the order was granted."8 However, an officer may use
such information "to the extent such use is appropriate to the pro-
per performance of his official duties."8 Additionally, he is author-
ized to disclose information while giving testimony in any criminal
proceeding.82 However, the interception may be "used" (i.e. "dis-
closed")" through testimony apparently only when authorized or ap-
proved by a judge in whose district the interception took place
when the judge finds that the contents were "otherwise" (but for
the crime toward which the intercept was directed) intercepted in
accordance with the chapter. 4 Thus, when evidence of offenses other
than the enumerated drug offenses is obtained through electronic
surveillance, the Act severely limits disclosures and requires careful
treatment to avoid exclusion.
Significant civil 5 and criminal8 sanctions are provided for viola-
tion of the Act. From an evidentiary and criminal procedure
perspective it is most noteworthy that the Act provides the
broadest exclusionary sanction known to Louisiana law. If the
disclosure violates the Act, the contents of the communication and
evidence "derived therefrom" may not be received in evidence in
any "trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative com-
mittee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision
thereof . "..."87 The legislature has thus mandated an exclusionary
sanction which goes beyond that of the fourth amendment by apply-
ing it to grand jury, civil, legislative, and administrative pro-
ceedings.
80. LA. R.S. 15:1309A (Supp. 1980).
81. LA. R.S. 15:1309B (Supp. 1980).
82. LA. R.S. 15:1309C (Supp. 1980).
83. Although the term "used" is employed, in context it appears to mean used by
testimony which is equivalent to disclosure.
84. LA. R.S. 15:1309E (Supp. 1980).
85. LA. R.S. 15:1312 (Supp. 1980).
86. LA. R.S. 15:1303A(4) (Supp. 1980); LA. R.S. 15:1304A (Supp. 1980).
87. LA. R.S. 15:1307 (Supp. 1980).
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